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I: ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
 
The command, control, communicatIon, and
 
I nte I 1.1 gence (C 3 I) sy stems wh I ch contro I the US strateg 1c
 
forces can be vulnerable to the large electromagnetic
 
pUlses! (E = 25,000 volts/meter) that are created by hIgh
 
altitude (100 to 500 km) or low altitude (0 to 2 km)
 
bursts of nuclear weapons. This vulnerability has been
 
perce Ived as creat I ng a poss I b Ie Jnstab I I I ty In the arms
 
race. If a country perceIves' that the use of Its
 
strategic forces could be negated by the EMP so that It
 
could not command and control Its missiles, thIs country
 
might be tempted to adopt a "launch on warning" polley so
 
that It would use Its weapons rather than lose them to a
 
preemptive fIrst strike. The situation 15 not as
 
unstable as I have characterized It because both natIons
 
have hardened theIr systems to partially withstand the
 
EMP and both nations have viable, second-strike missiles
 
based on submarInes that are not vulnerable to a first
 
str I ke. However, the percept Ion of vu I nerab r I I ty r n the
 
land-based leg of the strategIc triad (land/sea/aIr> can
 
create pressures for a "now, or never", Iaunch-on-warn I ng
 
response. Since some of the C3 I facilities, such as the
 
Air Force's Looking Glass command post In the sky, are
 
more VUlnerable than some of the strategIc forces that
 
they are Intended to dIrect, and sInce the U.S.
 
land-based mIssIles could be vulnerable to an EMP attack.
 
It Is clear that the EMP can affect mJ Iitary pol Icy.
 
A brief dIscussion of the mechanIsm that creates the 
EMP Is given below: In an explosIon of a nuclear weapon, 
many of the fissIon fragments are created In an excIted 
state. SInce these excIted states have energies of 1 MeV 
or more, their I rfet/mes are much less than the rfsetime 
of the explosIon (about 10 nanoseconds); the 
de-excitation gamma rays are emItted promptly. These 
prompt gamma rays Interact wIth aIr molecules and create 
forward scattered Compton electrons whIch constItute an 
energetic (about 1 MeV), negative current flowIng 
radially outward from the weapon (FIg. 1). In order to 
have a large EMP, It Is necessary to remove the spherical 
symmetry around the nuclear weapon. At low altItudes 
above the earth, a net dIpole moment Is created because 
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the Compton electrons are in the form of a hemIsphere 
rIsIng above the earth; the asymmetry of the rIsing, 
charged hemisphere creates the EMP. At high altitudes, 
the symmetry is broken because the aIr density varies 
exponentially with height above the earth so that the 
Compton electrons are created asymmetr Ica I IY an d a net 
dipole moment is created. The electrons created from the 
very high altItude bursts (above the atmosphere) follow a 
helical path about the earth's magnetIc fIeld lInes In 
the very thin upper atmosphere; the centripetal 
acceleration of these Compton electrons creates the EMf. 
In additIon, the x-rays following a nuclear explosIon can 
also produce EMP effects by ionizing the atmosphere and 
momentarily affecting the magnetic field confIguration of 
the Earth. 
FigureL Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). During a nuclear 
explosIon gamma rays are emitted promptly from the 
excIted states of the fission fragments; these prompt 
gamma rays transfer their energy to electrons In aIr 
molecules by the Compton scattering process. The EMf Is 
generated by these relativIstIc electrons by several 
mechanisms whIch depend on the altitude (H) of the 
nuc Iear exp los r on above the earth. A surface blast at 
low altitudes (H = 0-2 km) causes a hemispherIcal, rising 
Compton current whIch creates a large net vertical 
dIpole current. An aIr burst (H = 2-20 km) creates a 
sma I I net vert Ica I d r po Ie moment beca use the asymetr Ica I 
densIty of air whIch varies 
exponentially with height. A 
high altItude (H > 40 km) 
explosIon creates Compton 
electrons that revolve In 
A 
H>40km circles around the earth's 
magnetic fIeld lines; the 
t centrIpetal acceleration of 
. the Compton electrons 
~ ~ produces EMP radiation. 
H=O-2km Because the Compton electrons 
are relativistic, the EMP 
radIation from the Individual 
electrons have a partial 
degree of coherence whIch can 
give very large E fields of 
greater than 25,000 Vim. The 
hIgh-altItude EMP pulse can 
f Iluminate wide areas of the 
earth's surface; the range of 
H	 the EMP Is determ I ned by its 
I Ine-of-slght dIstance, 0 = 
(2RH)l/2 where R Is the radius 
of the Earth. 
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. I.A. The Range of EMP. Assume that suff rcrent 
megatonnage Is available for the EMP pulse, and that one 
must only consider I Ine-of-slght geometry when 
consIdering coverIng the US wIth the EMP pulse. The 
heIght (H) of the blast that Is necessary to cover 50% 
and 100% of the US Is determIned as follows: . The 
extremum dIstance (D) from the nuclear detonation to the 
ground Is obtaIned (FIg. 1) from a right triangle which 
has one side as the dIstance D, the other sIde the radius 
(R) of the earth at the locatIon In questIon, and the 
hypotenuse extends from the center of the earth to the 
blast (H + R). It follows that 
R2 + 0 2 = (H + R) 2 : ~2 + 2HR 
when H «R. From thIs we obtaIn the heIght of the EMP 
blast to cover al I the US 
H '" D2 /2R = (2500 km)2/(Z)(6400 km) ~ 500 km 
For the case of 50% of the US, 0 '" 1800 km and H = 250 
km. 
I. B. The Strength of the EMP FIe Ids. The 
approxImate average (rms) E fIeld generated by the EMP 
pulse at a locatIon D = 1000 km from the blast Is 
determ I ned by assum I n9 the fa I low Ing: (1) A one megaton 
weapon contaIns 10 15 calorles or 4.2 x 1015 J; (2) The 
prompt gamma rays constItute 0.3% of the total energy; 
they have an average energy of about 1 MeV; and they are 
emItted over the 10 ns rlsetlme of the blast; and (3) 
About 0.6% of the total prompt gamma ray energy Is 
converted Into forward-scattered Compton electrons near e 
= O. (If each of the fissIon fragments emItted a 1 MeV 
gamma ray, and If 50% of these gamma rays were not 
absorbed by the materIals of the weapon, then about 0.5% 
(1 MeV/ZOO MeV) of the energy of the weapon would be In 
the form of prompt gamma rays.) The amount of energy
avaIlable for the EMP pul·se Trom the 1 megaton weapons Is 
about 
UEMP = (4.2 x 1015 J)(O.003)(O.006) = 7.6 x 10 10 J. 
ThIs energy can be consIdered to approxImately evenly 
dIstrIbuted tn a spherIcal shell with a volume (4'IT02 )(T) 
where 0 is the dIstance from the sIte to the blast. The 
thIckness, T, of the EMP shel J Is the product of the 
speed of lIght and the time duratIon of the blast, or T = 
(3 X 10 8 m/s)(10-s s) = 3 meters. Since 50% of the stored 
energy resIdes In the electrIc fIelds, we obtain 
UEMP/2 c (EhE2/2)(4'1TD2 T), or 
E = (UEMP/41TEoT)lf2 /0 = (7.6 X 1010 x 9 X 109 /3)1/2 
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/(10 6 ) '" 15000 volts/meter. 
A more sophistIcated calculation of the E fIeld Is 
carried out In I.C below, but this approximate estImate 
Is sufficient to show that the E field can be quite 
large. The energy/cm2 deposited on the semiconducting 
components used In C3 I I s of the order of 
<7.6 x 10 10 J)/(41T)(10 8 cm)2 ::: 6 X 10- 7 J/cm2 
This flux of energy can be effectively multiplied by the 
area of powerllnes, antennae or missile bodIes, and the 
resulting electrical transients can be sufficient to 
destroy many of the semIconducting devIces. 
I.C Frequency Spectrum. A fundamental calculation 
of the frequency and field strength dIstributions from a 
high altItude burst Involves a calculatIon of the 
magnItUde of the Compton electronIc charge and how thIs 
charge accelerates In the earth's magnetic field. In 
order to do this we must consider the relativIstic 
expressIon for the radiative power, 
P = e 2 a2 y" /61TEOC 
from an accelerated charge where a Is the acceleratIon 
and 'Y::: 1/(1 - V2 /C 2 )UZ. Using this relationship, the 
approximate magnitUde of the E field from a hIgh 
altitude, 1 megaton explosIon, and the maximum frequency 
of the EMP spectrum are determined as follows: Because 
the duration of the explosion Is about 10- 8 s, the maximum 
frequency possible for the EMP Is about 100 MHz, but in 
practice It Is considerably· lower. Since the Compton 
electrons have a kinetic energy of about 1 MeV = 2 moc2 ; 
Y=3 and vic = 0.94. The radius of gyratIon (r) of the 
Compton electrons In the earth's fIeld of 0.6 Gauss Is 
r = "("bv/eS ::: (3)(9.1 X 10- 31 kg)(O.94)(3 X 10 8 m/s)/ 
(1.6 x 10-19 C)(0.6 x 10-~ Tl = 80 m 
The frequency of radIatIon assocIated wIth this motIon Is 
::: vir = (0.94)(3 x 10 8 m/s)/(80 m) = 3.5 Mrad/s, or f '" W 
/2Tf '" 0 .56 MHz. 
The approximate number of prompt gamma rays emItted 
from the 1 megaton explosion Is 
Nr ::: (4.2 X 10
15 J)(0.003l<1 MeV/1.6 x 10-13 J)/ 
(1 MaV/n '" 7.9 x 10 25 r/Mton 
Since about 0.6% of this energy Is converted to Compton 
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electrons, the approximate InItial number of Compton 
electrons produced Is Ne =: (0.006)(7.9 x 10 25 ) =: 4.7x1Q23 
electrons/Mton, or 75,000 coulombs/Mton. The InItIal 
centr I peta I acce Ierat Ion for each Com pton electron Is 
about 
2a :: rw :: (80 m) ( 3 .5 x 106 / S)2 :: 1.0 x 1015 m/ s • 
The Initial power radiated by this electron Is 
P = e2a2y4/67TE:oC3 :: (1.6 X 10-19 C)2 (1.0 X 1015 m/s2 )2 x 
(3 4 )(6 x 10 9 )/<3 x 10 8 )3 = 4.6 X 10-22 Watts. 
If the E fIelds from the N =: 4.7 X 1023 Compton electrons 
added Incoherently, the EMP radIated power would be only 
about (4.7 x 10 3 )(4.6 x 10-22 1'1) = 220 IV whIch would not 
produce a very large E field. However, since the 
wavelength of thIs radIatIon, A = c/f = 540 m,ls much 
longer than the spatIal thickness of the prompt 
radIatIon, T = c/(10 ns) = 3 m, and sInce the velocity of 
the Compton electrons Is approximately c, the EMP 
electric fields are partIally addItIve, or coherent. Let 
us Initially assume that all Ne electrons give coherent EMP radiation; a comparison of the field from the this 
completely coherent situation can then be compared to the 
given value of about 25,000 VIm to determine the degree 
of coherence. 
If the Compton electrons radlate~ coherently, the 
effective radiative power would be (Ne)P = 1.0 x 10 26 W 
whIch Is similar to the power of the sunl The average 
value of the Poynting vector for thIs radiation 
(neglecting the sln 2 (8) distribution) Is P/4TID 2 where D 
Is the distance from the closest Compton electrons to the 
site (perhaps an average effective value of 100 km). 
From thIs the average E field Is given by 
E;: (P/4'rrE:o CD 2 )1/2:: ((1.0 x 1026 1'1)(9 x 10 9 )/ 
2(3 x 10 8 m/s)(1010 m »1/2= 5.5 xl0 8 VIm. 
SInce this result Is about 10 4 times larger than the 
reported val ue of 2.5 x 10'+ VIm, we see that, on ave'rage, 
only about 0.01% of the forward-scattered Compton 
electrons must be tota I IY coherent. As the Compton 
electrons loes energy, lower frequency, longer wavelength 
components are added to the EMP dIstrIbutIon, and the 
radIation becomes less coherent. 
Rather large currents can be generated by the EMP. 
The voltage developed along the length of a 20 m mlssl Ie 
coul d be as much as V = (25,000 Vim) (20 m) :: 500,000 V. 
Since the Inductive Impedance of. a missIle at 1 MHz Is 
about Z = 10 ohms, the current flowing along the surface 
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of the missile could be as high as 
= VIZ = (5 x 10 5 V)/(10 ohms) = 50,000 Amperes. 
By coupling through various InductIve and capacitive 
transfer impedances, this current can produce voltage 
transients on the center conductors of the cables In the 
mIssIle on the order of 1 to 100 volts. While this 
amount of voltage will only burn out the most sensitive 
semiconductors, It could upset the digital circuitry and 
nullify Its computer logic. Much larger voltages coul d 
be developed on these logic elements If one considers the 
voltages developed on the powerllnes to the missIle 
sItes, but It Is possible to overcome these dlfflculrtres 
by shielding and hardening the electronics with filter 
circuits and fiber optics. 
I I: PARTICLE AND LASER-BEAM WEAPONS 
The superpowers are currently developing weapons 
that would utilize the kinetic energy (In the GeV range) 
of particle beams or the energy content of laser beams to 
destroy Incoming missiles, surface cruise missiles, 
shIps, or satellites. The particle-beam and laser-beam 
weapons might be mounted on the surface of the earth, In 
the space shuttle, or on satellite statfons In space. 
These weapons have to be descrIbed as futurIstic since 
there are many technological obstlcals that must be be 
overcome before they would become operational. In 
addItion, these weapons would be vulnerable to 
counte~measures by the attacking force. These weapon 
systems have been descrlbed 3 In some detail by K. Tslpls, 
et ai, and we wll I discuss only their more general 2 
properties. 
I I •A• Ene r 9y De p0 sit Ion. The flu x 0 fen erg y (J / cm2) 
that would prelgnlte the chemical explosives around a 
nuclear weapon In the Incoming mlssl Ie can be estImated. 
Fol lowing Tslpls, et ai, assume that a temperature rIse 
of 500°C can prelgnlte the explosive material which has a 
densIty of P = 0.8 g/cm 3 and a molecular weight of about 
M = 50. In addition, assume that the absorption length 
for 1 GeV electrons Is about 10 cm; the beam loses about 
10% of Its energy in 1 em. The energy density needed to 
pre detonate the chemical explosive Is Q = CPllT/M where 
the 6T is the temperature rise and the specific heat C = 
3R = 25 J/mole-DC (since T > GO' the Debye temperature). 
We obtain 
Q = <3R)PllT/M =(25)(0.8)(500)/50 = 200 J/cm s . 
Since about 10% of the energy Is desposlted In 1 cm, the 
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energy Intensity of the beam must be about 2000 J/cm 2 in 
order to deposit 200 J/cm 3 in the chemIcal explosive. 
This same flux of energy would raIse the temperature, ~T, 
of the al umlnum missll e: 
Q = 200 J/cm 3 = (3R)P6T/M = (25)(2.7)(~T)/27 
which gIves T = 80°C. This modest temperature rise 
would begin to cause some Internal stresses and 
mIsalIgnment In the missile. Doses about 8 times larger 
(16,000 J/cm2 and 1500 J/cm 3 ) would raIse aluminum to Its 
meltIng temperature of 660°C. In addition, the particles 
can cause havoc with the semIconductIng components In the 
guidance systems; energy densitres as low 25 J/cm 3 can 
cause shIfts in the switching thresholds of the cIrcuit 
elements and 1000 J/cm 3 can destroy the elements. The 
energetIc partIcles would create centers for trappIng, 
and recombinatIon which would reduce the lIfetime of the 
minorIty carrIers. 
II.B. Beam Current and Angul ar Resol utlon. What 
mIn Imum beamcu rrent of 1 GEV electrons wou I d be 
necessary to prelgnlte the chemIcal explosive In the 
Incoming missile? Assume that the size of the beam Is 
dictated by the 1 meter diameter of the mIssIle booster 
and that the pulse duration Is determIned by the velocity 
of the missIle, v = 10'+ m/s. What angular accuracy (liB) 
would be requIred to disable a mIssile which Is 1000 km 
away and above the atmosphere? 
Using the energy intensity of 2000 J/cm 2 (Sec. 
II.A), the energy delivered to an area of 1 m2 (dictated 
by the diameter of the missile) Is (2000 J/cm 2 )(10'+ cm 2 ) 
= 2 x 10 7 J. In order to keep the area of the beam on 
the mlssl Ie for a sIngle shot (wIthout continuous 
tracking), the tIme duration of the pulse must be less 
than t = (1 m/l0'+ m/s) = 0.1 msec. The energy in the 
pUlse is Vlt = 2 x 10 7 J where V = 10 9 volts andl Is the 
current In amperes. Solving for I, we get 
1= (2 x 10 7 )/Vt = (2 x 10 7 )/(10 9 )(10-'+) = 200 A. 
If the beam was Intended to melt aluminum or destroy 
semIconductIng components, the current and energy of the 
beam must be at least five tImes hIgher, or 1000 amperes 
and 10 B J. It has been estimated that the effIciency of 
producing a pUlse of particles Is about 1/6, thus It 
takes about 6 x 10 6 J to make the 1000 ampere pulse. 
Since It takes about 0.9 pound of coal to generate a kwh 
= 3.6 x 10 6 J, it would take about 150 pounds of coal (or 
1000 pounds of TNT) to generate one pUlse; the large 
amount of any type of fuel would certainly complicate the 
logistics of placing either partlcle- or laser-beam 
weapons on a space station. For comparison sake, there 
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are already eXisting high-voltage, low-current 
accelerators, such as the Fermi lab's proton accelerator 
wh r ch has a current of 0.1 mII I I amperes at an energy of 
500 GeV, and there are low-voltage, high-current electron 
accelerators used In the fusion program which have a 
current of 10 6 amperes (per beam) at an energy of 2 MeV. 
Because the earth's magnetl c fie Id wII I def Iect 
long-range, charged particle beams, a beam of neutral 
hydrogen atoms (produced from H- beams passing through a 
stripper gas) might be considered. The present 
technology Is not yet capable of these requirements as 
the Los Alamos Meson Factory Is capable of developing 
currents of on Iy 0.15 amperes of H- Ions at 1 GeV. 
In order to "shoot a bul let 1000 km away with a 
bullet", the beam must be aligned to within an accuracy 
of M ::: 1 m/l0 6 m::: 10- 6 radIans. Since this kind of 
accuracy would be diffIcult to carry out, It Is lIkely 
that the beam current would have to be correspondingly 
Increased ~o compensate for a larger spread In the beam 
size at the target. If M '" 10- 5 , the current and total 
energy of the beam would have to be Increased by a factor 
of 100; If the target was considerably closer, this would 
not be necessary. . 
II.C. Burning a Hole In the Atmosphere. Since 
relatIvistic electrons and protons of about 1 GeV loes 
about 0.2 GeVlkm when they pass through air, they would 
not be able to penetrate through the entire atmosphere. 
Particle beam weapons that were located on the surface of 
the earth would have to be able to "burn a hole In the 
atmosphere" In order to reduce energy losses and make the 
weapon viable over longer distances. If the air density 
In the "hole" In the atmosphere was reduced by a factor 
of ten, then the energy loss rate would be reduced to 
0.02 GeVlkm, and the beam would then loes about 0.2 Gev 
(20% of the beam energy) to pass through the entire 
atmosphere of 10 km. Approximately how much energy would 
It take to reduce the densIty of the aIr by a factor of2ten In a "hole" that had an area of 1 cm and was 1 km 
long? The density of air Is 1.3 kg/m 3 and fts specific 
heat at constant pressure Is 1000 J/kg_oC. 
Using the perfect gas law, PV ::: nRT, we see that the 
temperature must be raised from about 300 K to 3000 K In 
order to allow a reduction In the densIty, n/V, by a 
factor of 10. The mass of the heated air In the 
atmospheric hole Is (1.3 kg/m 3 )(10 3 m)(10-~m2) ::: 0.13 kg. 
The amount of energy required to heat the "hole" Is 
Q ::: mC/H ::: (0.13)(1000)(2700) ::: 3.5 X 105 J. 
AdditIonal energy would be lost by the partial heating of 
the aIr forced out of the hole, by the loss of scattered 
radIatIon and secondary particles, and by turbulance. 
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Our value of 0.4 x 10 6 J/km Is a lower bound value and It 
Is about 25% of the more accurately calculated 3 value of 
1.5 x 10 6 J/km. ThIs energy loss Is about 1%/km of the 
beams energy of 10 6 J; a 10 km path wou I d use 10% of the 
beam's energy; this Is simi lar to the energy that would 
be lost by the beam as It passed through the hole. At 
thIs tIme It Is uncl~ar how long the high energy beam 
would remain In the hole over these extened distances. 
II.D. Laser Beam Weapons. Either a 25 kJ pulsed 
I aSer or a 1 MW cont I nuous Iaser Is capab Ie of destroy I ng 
nearby aIrcraft. However, sInce laser beams do not 
readily pass through fog or rain, the laser-beam weapons 
could not be counted on to defend against a surprise 
attack on a rainy day. For this reason, the laser-beam 
weapons (If they are ever deployed) would probably be 
used above the atmosphere. Let us determine the 
necessary energy for a laser pulse to destroy a missile 
1000 km away using these assumptions: (1) It takes a 
pUlse of about 1000 J/cm 2 (Sec. II.A) to create an 
Impulsive failure In thIn metal targets such as mIssiles; 
(2) The HF chemical laser has a wavelength A = 2.7 ~m; 
and (3) The beam extractIon mirror of the laser has a 
diameter d = 4 meters. The finite diameter of the 
extractIon mirror causes a diffraction broadenIng In the 
laser beam 
t.e = 1.22 A/ d :: (1.22) ( 2 .7 x 10- 6 m) /4 m = 0.8 x 10- 6 • 
This effect wI I I broaden the radius of the laser beam 
1000 km away to 
r = (M )(1000 km) = 0.8 m 
Since It takes about 1000 J/cm l of absorbed energy to 
partially melt and crack the missile body, the energy In 
the laser pulse must be (1000 J/cm l )(1f)(82 cm)2 :: 2 X 107 
J for the case of total absorption by the missile body; 
If the mlssl Ie reflects 90% of the energy, ten times as 
much energy will be needed, or 2 x 10 6 J. ThIs energy 
reqUirement Is consIderably larger than the presently 
contemplated 25 kJ pUlsed COl lasers (A :: 10.6 llm) being 
developed for the fusion program. If the weapon was a 1 
MW continuous laser, then the laser would have to be 
focused on the target for t :: (2 X 10 6 J)/(10 6 J/s) :: 200 
seconds = 3 minutes. The energy content of the Hand F 
. fuels Is about 1.4 x 10 6 J/kg; If the laser had an 
efficiency of 10%, It would take about 
(2 x 10 9 J)/(1.4 X 10 6 J/kg) :: 1400 kg 
of fuel for one pul se from the HF I aser. Thus, lasers In 
the visible region (A :: 0.5 Jl :: AHF/6) are being studIed. 
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I I I. ABM SYSTEMS 
There are a varIety of systems, other than particle 
and laser beams weapons (Sec. II), that are being 
cons I dered 4 to destroy Incom Ing miss I Ies. In th I s 
section we will briefly consIder the basic physics of 
(I I I .A) the Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS), (I I I.B) 
the high altitude Spartan ABM (1969), and (I I I.C) simple 
and novel systems. This appendix will not discuss the 
broader political, legal, and strategic aspects of the 
ABM. (See the chapter by A. Carnesale In thIs book). 
I I I.A. Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS). This 
system Is simIlar to the Sprint system that was 
considered In 1969, but It Is Intended to operate at 
lower altitudes, below about 50,000 feet. As In the case 
of Spr I nt, the fast neutrons from a 20 k II oton (kt) 
explosion are used to destroy the solId-state electronics 
and to disarm the nuclear warhead by the absorption of 
neutrons In the fissile materIal of the Incoming warhead. 
SInce 1 kt (4.2 x 10 l2 J) Is the equivalent of the total 
fission of about 55 grams of fissile material (0.23 gram 
moles), the number of neutrons escaping from a 20 kt 
fission warhead Is about 
(20 kt)(0.23 g moles)(6 x 1023 )(3 - 2) = 3 x 102'1 n. 
In thIs simple calculation, we have assumed that one 
neutron/fIssion (3 - 2) escapes from the warhead. The 
number of neutrons/cm 2 at a distance of 400 meters Is 
about 
(3 x 102'1 ) / ( 47f )( 4 x 10'1)2 = 1 .5 x 101 '1 n/ cm2 • 
This neutron flux at 400 m Is sImilar to value of 2 x 1d'l 
presented In Glasstone and Dolan5 and It Is capable of 
~Isarmlng a nuclear warhead under certain conditIons. 
III.B SPARTAN. The SPARTAN ABM was Intended (In 
1969) .to Interecept Incoming missiles high above the 
earth. Since the explosion would take place above the 
atmosphere In a vacuum, the energy going Into the shock 
and blast mode wou Id be essent I a I IY zero, and the 
fract Ion of the energy de II evered as therma I rad Iat Ion 
would be enhanced. This system Is no longer being 
considered because the very high altItude burst would 
develop an EMP pulse (Sec. I) whIch could disarm our own 
C3 1 systems. Nevertheless, for hIstorical reasons It Is 
of Interest to discuss brIefly thIs system. 
If one assumes that the average temperature of the 
exploding warhead Is sImilar to the core of the sun (18 x 
10 6 K), the most probable photon energy can be obtained 
from Wlen's law, and It Is about 7 keY, or In the soft 
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x-ray region. I f one assumes that the SPARTAN uses a 2 Mt 
warhead (2000 x 4.2 x 1012 J), and that 75% of Its energy 
goes Into thermal radIatIon, the heat flux at a dIstance 
of one km I s about 
(0.75)(8.4 x 101S J)/(47T)(10 5 cm)2 :: 5000 J/cm 2 • 
The 7 keY x-rays penetrate about 0.004 em In alumInum and 
would cause severe heatIng at thIs flux of energy (Sec. 
I I • A) • 
III.C SImple and Novel ABM Systems. This section 
wIll briefly discuss two systems, Swarmjet and Dust 
Defense which rely on the kinetic energy of Impact to 
destroy an Incoming re-entry vehicle (RV). A Swarmjet 
ABM system would work as follows: After radar has 
detected an attackIng RV, a launcher containIng many 
small, rod-like projectiles Is sent to the neighborhood 
of the RV. When the Swarmjet Is near the IncomIng RV, 
the rod I Ike projectIles are spread Into a pattern which 
would destroy the RV upon Impact. In addItion, others 
have consider developIng a large cloud of dust particles 
by exploding a nuclear warhead at the surface of the 
Earth near the sIlo which Is to be defended. Since the 
incoming RV has a velocity of the order of 10~ m/s; the 
kInetic energy of one gram of dust (wIth respect to the 
RV) Is about 
(0.5)(0.001 kg)(10" m/s)2 :: 0.5 X 10 5 Jig 
which Is about 10 - 100 times greater than chemIcal 
explosives. 
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